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Abstract
We examine the characteristics of national systems of corporate governance to theorize about the nature of the
shareholders' and employees' interests when it comes to reorganization, under the assumption that the firm is
coalitional in nature. We argue that corporate governance institutions prevalent in both the host and the target
country of the merging firms enable or constrain the ability of the acquirer to reorganize the target. Using a
cross-national dataset of corporate acquisitions and post-acquisition reorganization, we found support for our
predictions that stronger legal protection of shareholder rights in the acquirer country compared to the target
country increases the acquirer's ability to restructure the target's assets and leverage the target's resources,
while the protection of employee rights in the target country restricts the acquirer's ability to restructure the
target's assets and redeploy resources to and from the target.
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NATIONAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INSTITUTIONS  




We examine the characteristics of national systems of corporate governance to theorize about 
the nature of the shareholders’ and employees’ interests when it comes to reorganization, 
under the assumption that the firm is coalitional in nature. We argue that corporate 
governance institutions prevalent in the countries of origin of the merging firms enable or 
constrain the ability of the acquirer to reorganize the target.  Using a cross-national dataset of 
corporate acquisitions and post-acquisition reorganization, we found support for our 
predictions that stronger legal protection of shareholder rights in the acquirer country 
compared to the target country increases the acquirer’s ability to restructure the target’s assets 
and leverage the target’s resources, while the protection of employee rights in the target 
country restricts the acquirer’s ability to restructure the target’s assets and transfer resources 
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Mergers and acquisitions (M&As) are one of the most important ways in which companies 
seek to create value by gaining access to new capabilities or markets. They have also been 
touted as a way for firms to adjust to changes in their competitive environment. Scholars in 
the fields of economics and strategic management see acquisitions as a prime mechanism for 
firm survival and growth (Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1987; Bowman and Singh, 1993; Jensen, 
1993; Mitchell, 1994; Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 2001; Karim and Mitchell, 2000). Identifying a 
target and actually taking it over, however, are only the beginning of a process of 
reorganization that can take months, even years (Barney, 1988; Capron, 1999; Haspeslagh 
and Jemison, 1991; Zollo and Singh, 2004; Karim, 2006; Datta, 1991).  
The post-acquisition process is all about reorganization, and this process is rarely smooth 
because in acquiring a new bundle of assets and capabilities, the company also inherits the 
way in which the target is embedded in its institutional environment, including relationships 
with stakeholders like shareholders and employees (Buono and Bowditch, 1989; Haveman 
and Cohen, 1994; Larsson and Finkelstein, 1999). The management literature has long 
recognized that firms are coalitional in nature, that is, an arena in which various groups vie 
for influence over key decisions (Bendix, 2001; March, 1962; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). 
Therefore, the dynamics among the various corporate stakeholders, and the possible conflicts 
of interest among them, shape the acquirer’s ability to engage in reorganization. 
In this paper, we adopt an institutional perspective to argue that the ability of acquirers to 
reorganize their acquisition targets depends on the characteristics of the national corporate 
governance systems of the merging firms. Specifically, we explore the effect of the degree of 
protection of shareholder and employee rights on post-acquisition target reorganization, 
focusing our theoretical and empirical analysis on the regulative pillar of institutions (Scott, 
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2001:50-54). Target reorganization encompasses asset restructuring and resource transfers, 
both of which have the potential to pit the rights of shareholders against those of employees. 
Asset restructuring refers to actions such as the disposal of some of the acquired assets 
(which may entail layoffs), the recombination of those kept by the acquirer under a different 
organizational or managerial structure and the elimination of redundant activities and 
inefficient management practices, most likely in the target firm (Karim, 2006; Brickley and 
Van Drunen, 1990). Resource transfers refer to an actual shift of technological, marketing or 
operational knowledge from the acquirer to the target or vice versa, which may affect 
employees in various ways (Capron, 1999; Zollo and Singh, 2004).  
Post-acquisition reorganization provides institutional theory with an ideal setting in which 
to explore issues of power and influence. As Campbell (2004:1) noted, institutions “reflect 
the resources and power of those who made them and, in turn, affect the distribution of 
resources and power.” While research on hostile takeovers adopts this perspective (Hirsch 
1986; Schneper and Guillén 2004), our paper is the first to pursue an institutional analysis of 
the potentially divergent interests of shareholders and employees during the post-acquisition 
process. In emphasizing the causal role of the power and influence that stakeholders enjoy, 
given a set of regulatory corporate governance institutions, we build on the research agenda 
formulated by the coalitional view of the firm (March, 1962). Thus, we frame our analysis of 
post-acquisition reorganization in terms of the theory of macroregulatory institutions and 
their effects on behavior, decision making, and change (Campbell, 2004; Scott, 2001).  
By focusing attention on regulatory institutions at the national level, we address an 
important gap in the strategy literature. As Crossland and Hambrick (2007: 770) recently 
stated, “in the several works that have examined how environmental factors constrain 
executives, environment has always been equated with industry. There has been no 
consideration of the role of higher-order, macro-environmental forces on managerial 
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constraint (or its observed latitude of action).” While reorganization is a process that takes 
place at the micro level, it does not occur in an institutional vacuum. We argue that regulatory 
corporate governance institutions affect the reorganization process  by giving the various 
stakeholders in the firm different degrees of power and influence over corporate decisions, as 
business historians have noted (e.g., O’Sullivan, 2000, 2003). Strategy scholars have not 
theorized exactly how corporate governance systems may affect post-acquisition dynamics, 
and evidence on the extent to which national institutions influence the firm’s ability to change 
and adapt is scarce. In particular, we know little about how firms conduct their acquisition 
strategy across different national governance regimes, and we know even less about cross-
border post-acquisition reorganization, where shareholders and workers are subject to very 
different national corporate governance institutions. 
After controlling for the fact that acquirers may self-select into acquisitions from which 
they believe value can be extracted, in part due to the corporate governance system within 
which the target operates, we argue that acquirers embedded in a system that protects 
shareholder rights better than in the context in which the target resides, are likely to exert 
more pressure to reorganize the target during the post-acquisition period. We develop an 
institutional account of this process drawing on the conceptualization of shareholder interests 
in agency theory (Jensen, 1993). Going beyond agency insights, we also propose that target 
employees whose labor rights are well protected are likely to constrain the acquirer’s ability 
to restructure the target’s assets or to transfer resources across the merging firms. However, 
we note that acquirers have heterogeneous capabilities when it comes to dealing with 
different institutional regimes. We thus expect an acquirer’s past acquisition experience to 
moderate the effect of target employee rights on the acquirer’s ability to reorganize the target, 
as theories of experiential learning would predict (Levitt and March, 1988; Argote, Beckman, 
and Epple, 1990).  
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The paper is structured as follows. In the first section, we review the literature on the role 
of national corporate governance institutions in firm restructuring. In the second section, we 
develop our hypotheses. We then present our data and methods in the third section. We lastly 
present and discuss our results. 
 
NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
Corporate governance has to do with the allocation of rights and obligations among the firm’s 
stakeholders, including shareholders, managers, workers, and others with a stake in the 
corporation. The rights and obligations of the various stakeholders are defined and enforced 
to varying degrees depending on the institutions of corporate governance present in a given 
country. Those institutions include formal laws and regulations, codes of good governance, 
taken-for-granted assumptions about the appropriate role of the various stakeholders, and 
other informal norms of behavior sanctioned by tradition or practice (Aguilera and Jackson, 
2003; Guillén, 2000, 2001; Roe, 2004). 
We view “regulative” institutions, including those associated with corporate governance, 
not just as constraints but also as elements that support and empower actors (Scott, 2001: 50-
54; Schneper and Guillén, 2004). In other words, institutions contribute to constituting actors 
as such and to preserving their roles, rights, and obligations over time. For instance, under 
German corporate and labor laws, half of the seats on boards of directors of companies above 
a certain size are reserved for workers and their representatives. This kind of institutional 
support for worker rights is likely to have an impact on post-acquisition target reorganization.   
We take existing national corporate governance institutions as given, and examine their 
impact on post-acquisition target reorganization. As a result of history, power struggles, 
compromises and happenstance, corporate governance institutions differ vastly across 
countries, with important implications for the degree of influence enjoyed by shareholders 
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and workers (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 1999; Aguilera and Jackson, 2003; 
Schneper and Guillén, 2004). National corporate governance traditions are distinctive, deeply 
rooted, and relatively resistant to change. An important element that explains persistent cross-
country corporate governance differences has to do with the underlying ideology as to how 
the corporation should be governed: as an economic entity whose purpose is to maximize 
shareholder value, or as a social institution whose purpose is to further the interests of the 
corporation itself, typically considering the interests of multiple stakeholders (Aguilera and 
Jackson, 2003; O’Sullivan, 2003; Schneper and Guillén, 2004). Countries fall at some point 
along a continuum defined by two major types: liberal-market economies and coordinated-
market economies (Hall and Soskice, 2001). Liberal-market economies – such as the UK, the 
US, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and Ireland – are distinguished by competitive market 
arrangements, with supply and demand forces having a significant impact on organizational 
outcomes and processes. In liberal-market economies, shareholder rights are highly protected 
and labor relations are characterized by open-market relationships, with firms having the 
freedom to hire and fire employees almost at will (Aguilera and Dencker, 2004). 
Coordinated-market economies – such as Germany, Switzerland, and the Scandinavian 
countries – are characterized by a high degree of organization and coordination of interest 
groups. In these stakeholder-centered countries, employees, suppliers, customers, and 
financial institutions can exert legitimate claims on firms that go beyond pure arm’s length 
transactions. 
An important issue in corporate stakeholder research is the definition of which specific 
actors should be included in the analysis. Although Freeman (1984: 46) suggested that any 
“group or individual who can affect, or is affected by, the achievement of the organization’s 
objectives” can be called a stakeholder, recent theorists have tended to narrow their attention 
to the most important sets of actors for a given context (Windsor, 1992; Mitchell, Agle, and 
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Wood, 1997). Carroll (1989) defined stakeholders as those actors who have either a legal or a 
moral claim over the actions of the firm. Blair (1995) and Aguilera and Jackson (2003) 
argued that only stakeholders with a significant firm-specific investment should enjoy 
influence in discussions about corporate control. Other scholars stressed the role of  
“secondary” stakeholder groups as groups that affect or are affected by firm behavior 
(Freeman, 1984) yet do not have a formal contractual or legal bond with the firm, as is the 
case with employees, customers, and government regulators (Eesley & Lenox, 2006). 
Although some scholars have studied the relevance of stakeholders like managers, 
suppliers, customers, political parties, and the surrounding community (Delmas and Toffel, 
2008; for a review, see Donaldson and Preston, 1995), we focus our analysis on shareholders 
and employees because of their relatively direct claim on the allocation of the company’s 
cash flows and rewards and because they are the most frequently mentioned actors for their 
potential impact on cross-national differences in corporate governance (e.g., Franks and 
Mayer, 1997; Aoi, 1997; Phan and Yoshikawa, 2000; Driver and Thompson, 2002; Aguilera 
and Jackson, 2003; Jackson, Höpner, and Kurdelbusch, 2004). 
 
INSTITUTIONS, AGENCY, AND POST-ACQUISITION TARGET 
REORGANIZATION 
A useful way to begin a theoretical analysis of the impact of national corporate governance 
institutions on post-acquisition reorganization is to examine the basic premises of the 
shareholder-oriented model. The market-for-corporate-control hypothesis contends that the 
interests of shareholder-principals are best protected by unrestricted competition for the 
stewardship of corporate assets using a takeover market (Manne, 1965). Beyond the 
disciplinary merit of disposing of “managerial deadwood” (Samuelson, 1970), economists 
and strategy scholars credit acquisitions with stimulating industry restructuring (Dutz, 1989; 
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Anand and Singh, 1997), achieving efficiency gains (Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1987), 
recombining resources (Capron, Mitchell and Swaminathan, 2001), and exploring new 
capability domains (Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 2001). These potential gains, however, are 
contingent on the institutional incentives and constraints facing the acquirer’s managers, 
which may provide them with more or fewer opportunities to restructure assets or transfer 
resources following the acquisition. Following the extant literature, we argue that the 
acquirer’s shareholders are bent on maximizing the positive impact the acquisition will have 
on their wealth, in terms of the cash flows that accrue to them, while minimizing the negative 
consequences. Indeed, acquirer shareholders generally prefer to see management move 
swiftly to reorganize the target (Jensen, 1993).  
Much of the corporate governance literature on the acquisition process highlights 
shareholder rights and neglects the role of other stakeholders, treating employment relations, 
in particular, as exogenously determined by labor markets (e.g., Blair and Roe, 1999; Buono 
and Bowditch, 1989). This omission reflects the theoretical focus of agency scholars on 
interests of the owners, i.e., the shareholders (Emirbayer and Goodwin, 1994), as well as the 
weak employee participation in corporate governance in the United States compared to 
countries such as Germany or Sweden (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003; Schneper and Guillén, 
2004). During the post-acquisition process, the target company’s employees are crucial to 
achieving the benefits of the acquisition, but often have interests opposed  to those of the 
acquirer’s shareholders (Aguilera and Dencker, 2004). The disruptive effects of acquisitions 
on the target’s employees are well documented (Walsh, 1988; Haveman and Cohen, 1994; 
Conyon et al., 2002); acquisitions often lead to a breach of trust with target firm employees 
(Shleifer and Summers, 1988).  
Applying the same logic of economic self-interest to employees would lead one to assume 
that they are also predominantly interested in maximizing cash flows, in the form of the 
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wages they receive. Raise in target employee wages can be obtained through higher post-
acquisition target efficiency. Yet, higher wages may have less appeal if they are accompanied 
by the fear of job losses, which may happen as a result of target reorganization like 
downsizing and change in work practices. Furthermore, much cross-national research 
indicates that workers are also interested in working conditions, intrinsic rewards such as job 
satisfaction, and employment stability (Bendix, 2001), which may also affect cash flows to 
shareholders. Most importantly, workers are not as mobile as shareholders, finding it much 
more difficult to switch from one firm to another. Let us analyze each stakeholder in turn. 
 
Acquirer’s Shareholders and Target Reorganization 
Under the assumption that shareholders are interested in maximizing their wealth, they will 
expect management to take action after the acquisition to ensure that the target delivers 
appropriate cash flows. The literature points out that in countries where shareholders are in a 
better position to assert their rights, managers (i.e., their agents) feel more pressure to make 
decisions consistent with shareholders’ interests (Fligstein, 1990; La Porta et al., 1998). 
Drawing on an international sample, Atanassov and Kim (2008) found that shareholders’ 
ability to force value-enhancing measures on poorly performing firms varies with the degree 
of shareholder protection. Large-scale layoffs and top management turnover are more likely 
when investor protection is strong. In a study of eight emerging economies, Gibson (2003) 
showed that firms in countries with a legal system of Anglo-Saxon origin are more likely to 
experience management turnover after poor performance because the common law system in 
these countries tends to provide stronger shareholder protection. 
In order to serve the interests of shareholders, it is customary for managers to take actions 
to reorganize the target firm in order to increase the cash flows generated by the acquired 
assets. The M&A literature has outlined two main types of actions acquiring firms take to 
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deliver returns to their shareholders: restructuring the target’s assets to save costs and 
transferring resources across the merging firms to enhance capabilities (Barney, 1988; 
Capron, 1999; Karim, 2006; Brickley and Van Drunen, 1990). Asset restructuring is the focus 
of much economics and strategy research, which sees acquisitions as an opportunity to take 
corrective action or to achieve cost savings, thanks to the size of the newly-formed company. 
Where acquisitions are made in order to turn around underperforming targets, acquirers are 
likely to impose substantial corporate governance changes on the target firm, by restructuring 
its board, management, labor force, and internal organizational processes in order to serve the 
shareholders’ interests (Jensen, 1993). Several empirical M&A studies also stress the role of  
cost synergies (Anand and Singh, 1997; Capron, 1999; Zollo and Singh, 2004). Research has 
documented post-acquisition downsizing of the target’s managerial team (Walsh, 1988; 
Franks and Mayer, 1996) and workforce (Capron, 1999; Conyon et al., 2002).  
Studies of mergers and acquisitions also highlight the resource-based view of the firm and 
examine resource sharing (or redeployment) among merging firms (Barney, 1988). An 
acquirer can transfer its expertise to help the target become more cost-efficient and also to 
help it grow (Penrose, 1959; Capron, 1999). The acquirer can also access complementary 
resources by acquiring targets with unique resources, for example, in human-intensive 
acquisitions (Coff, 1999; Ranft and Lord, 2002). Sharing technological resources 
(engineering skills, research, proprietary technology, patents, know-how) may enhance the 
merging firms’ innovation capability, which can be converted into a price premium and/or 
increased volume, leading to higher revenues (Karim and Mitchell, 2000). Acquirers can also 
benefit from sharing commercial resources through greater geographical coverage and 
product line extension.  
However, existing national governance institutions influence the extent to which the 
acquirer’s shareholders can harvest the benefits of acquisitions. Managers under pressure 
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from powerful shareholders will move quickly to replace the target’s management, 
restructure its assets and transfer resources, with a view to attaining better performance as 
speedily as possible. In contrast, managers who operate under less shareholder pressure might 
be more inclined to postpone unpopular post-acquisition measures in order to keep the peace 
inside the organization. They might maintain the target in a preservation mode in order to 
maintain consensus at the expense of achieving economic benefits (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 
1991).  
Comparative legal scholarship (Reynolds and Flores, 1989; Glendon, Gordon, and 
Osakwe, 1994) and more recent economic analyses (La Porta et al., 1998; La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 1999) show that shareholders’ interests receive different degrees of 
legal protection across countries. If national legislation protects shareholder rights, one would 
expect managers to move swiftly in the wake of an acquisition to extract as much value from 
the target as possible through asset restructuring and resource transfers. Acquirer 
shareholders might also take action to remove managers at the target (Jensen, 1993). If the 
rights of the target’s shareholders, prior to the acquisition, were well protected, they would 
have probably put pressure on the target’s management to maximize their wealth well before 
the acquisition happened. In contrast, if the rights of the target’s shareholders, prior to the 
acquisition, were not particularly well protected, there are more likely to be opportunities for 
restructuring the target and reaping economic benefits within it after the acquisition happens. 
Therefore, asset restructuring and resource transfers are more likely when the new owners 
enjoy significantly better protection of their ownership rights than the previous owners did.1 
In the context of cross-border acquisitions, one such situation occurs when the new owners 
                                                 
1
 Note that we do not assume that managers of acquiring firms from shareholder-friendly countries make 
post-acquisition decisions that are always consistent with the interests of their shareholders. The organizational 
literature has indeed stressed that even in countries that are shareholder-friendly, acquisition strategies can be 
beset by agency problems (Palmer and Barber, 2001). Yet, comparatively speaking, agency problems with 
acquisition strategies will tend to be less pronounced when the acquirer firm is located in an ostensibly 
shareholder-friendly country.  
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are from a country that gives better protection of shareholder rights than the target’s country. 
Accordingly, we predict: 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): The stronger the legal protection of shareholder rights in the 
acquirer country when compared to the target country, the more the target firm will 
experience asset restructuring (H1a) and resource transfers (H1b).  
 
 
Target’s Employees and Target Reorganization 
While much prior research examines the extent to which shareholder rights are protected by 
corporate governance institutions, we also consider the status of employees. In the wake of an 
acquisition, the target’s employees can become important stakeholders whose preferences 
and actions affect the ability of the new management team to engage in asset restructuring 
and resource transfers. The relative power of employees also differs across countries because 
of cultural, political and legal factors (Blair and Roe, 1999): the greater the influence of labor, 
the lower the priority of value-enhancement objectives. Faleye, Mehrotra and Morck (2006) 
find that US publicly traded firms whose employees have a greater voice in corporate 
governance (i.e., own at least 5% of firm equity) deviate more from value maximization, 
spend less on new capital, take fewer risks, grow more slowly, create fewer new jobs, and 
exhibit lower labor and total factor productivity. Labor is primarily concerned with 
maintaining current and future cash flows at a level sufficient to prevent wage or benefit cuts 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1979), thus explaining a low risk, low investment, and low growth 
strategy. 
Although post-acquisition reorganization measures should be beneficial to shareholders, 
some or all of the gains may be made at the expense of other stakeholders. Shleifer and 
Summers (1988) view the change of control of a company as an opportunity to renege on 
implicit aspects of the employment contract and to renegotiate employment, effort, and pay 
levels on terms less favorable to the target’s employees. Benefits from target asset 
reorganization may indeed be obtained at the expense of target employees’ interests. 
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Empirical studies have found that the target firm is likely to bear the brunt of restructuring 
measures and layoffs (Capron, 1999), which often trigger resistance from target employees. 
Asset restructuring at the target also entails internal reorganization of the workforce, 
including the elimination of jobs which typically creates gaps in the division of labor that 
must be filled by reorganizing the remaining jobs, producing a cascade of lateral and vertical 
internal movement in response to the elimination of organizational positions (DiPrete, 1993). 
Similarly, benefits from resource transfers still hinge on the acquirer’s ability to redesign 
work practices, transfer people across sites or functions, or recombine teams (Stovel, Savage, 
and Bearman, 1996; Capron, Mitchell, and Swaminathan, 2001). Both vulnerable employees 
and employees with vested interests are likely to oppose these resource transfers if they have 
to learn new skills or if they lose power to the benefit of new individuals and groups within 
the organization (Levitt and March, 1988; Leonard-Barton, 1992; Oliver, 1997).  
In countries like Germany, where national corporate governance institutions strictly 
protect the labor force, adjustments in labor force are harder to implement, thus raising the 
costs of post-merger reorganization (Debroux, 1996; Cappelli, 2000). In other countries and 
regions – Japan, South Korea, South Asia, Southern Europe, Latin America – workers have a 
level of protection that stronger than the typical liberal-market economies of the US and the 
UK but less strong than the coordinated economies of Central and Northern Europe. 
Stricter employment protection laws are associated with lower turnover in the labor 
market and with extended periods of work and unemployment (Gugler and Yurtoglu, 2004). 
As a result, the more a country’s corporate governance institutions protect workers’ rights, 
the lower the employer autonomy and the lower the geographical and professional mobility 
of its labor force (Sparrow, Schuler, and Jackson, 1994). For instance, evidence suggests that 
Janapanese companies are more willing than American firms to incur costs (in the form of 
lost profits) to protect their workforce from the effects of economic downturns. Thus, 
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workers who claim “property rights” to their jobs (Althauser and Kalleberg, 1981) may have 
enough power to mitigate the firm’s response to external pressures and force it to shield them 
from the effects of industrial restructuring (DiPrete, 1993).  
Employees in a highly protective national labor regime are likely to prefer voice rather 
than exit in response to grievances because there may be penalties attached to leaving the 
firm without penalty (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003). Rigid labor markets make hiring a worker 
somewhat of an irreversible decision and reduce the mobility of the labor force (Gugler and 
Yurtoglu, 2004). In addition, when employee skills are firm-specific, the employee’s greater 
dependence on the firm makes the option of leaving less appealing (Williamson, Watcher, 
and Harris, 1975). Employment protection makes labor turnover more difficult and adds to 
insiders’ bargaining power. Strict hiring and firing regulations tend to increase the power of 
unions at the firm level. 
When post-acquisition reorganization affects the interests of the target’s employees, we 
expect them to resist the post-merger changes to the extent that national corporate governance 
institutions enable them to do so. Therefore, we propose: 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): The stronger the legal protection of the target’s employee rights 
in the target country, the less the target firm will experience asset restructuring (H2a) 
and resource transfers (H2b). 
 
Acquirer’s M&A Experience as a Moderator 
Firms and their managers differ in their ability to operate effectively in a given national 
corporate governance system and to handle negotiations that address stakeholders’ concerns. 
The organizational literature recognizes that capabilities are learned over time as the firm 
accumulates experience (Argote, Beckman, and Epple, 1990; Haleblian and Finkelstein, 
1999). Prior research stresses that experiential learning accumulates as a result of the 
reinforcement of prior choices (Levitt and March, 1988; Mayer and Argyres, 2004; Zollo and 
Singh, 2004). Each firm has a stock of collective knowledge that informs the pattern of 
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decisions its managers make. Organizational learning, accumulated by making an acquisition 
and reorganizing the target, influences this collective knowledge. Experience with 
acquisitions provides opportunities for managers to learn from their successes and failures, 
while shaping the development of routines that help them deal with similar situations and 
contingencies in the future (Cyert and March 1963; Nelson and Winter, 1982; Haleblian and 
Finkelstein, 1999). In turn, the success or failure of prior experiences reinforces the firm’s 
routines (Levitt and March, 1988). With increased acquisition experience, firms are likely to 
develop an embedded knowledge of how to conduct post-acquisition changes, and 
specifically how to deal with target employees (Zollo and Singh, 2004; Zollo and Winter, 
2002). 
Controlling for the likely effect of experience on the acquirer’s choice of target firm and 
country, we argue that acquisition experience offers the acquirer insights into the best 
approaches to negotiate with stakeholders in order to address their concerns. Hillman and 
Keim (2001) argue that managing relationships with primary stakeholders such as employees 
can constitute intangible, socially complex resources that may enhance firms’ ability to 
outperform competitors. Because of the relational aspects that underlie these activities, time 
and experience are likely to be important. With acquisition experience, acquirers may become 
more capable of anticipating the reaction of internal stakeholders and negotiating with them 
very early in the acquisition process. Frequent acquirers may also be better at designing 
incentive schemes and communicating the benefits of job rotation, new work practices, and 
work flexibility. Acquisition experience may help acquirers reduce the trauma of target 
reorganization and help survivors overcome their resistance and recommit to being motivated 
and productive (Brockner, 1988; Cartwright and Cooper, 2000). Overall, frequent acquirers 
also may become better at aligning the pace of integration with the type of post-integration 
measures they need to take. They may also be more adept at weighing the costs of 
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downsizing the workforce or reshuffling resources against the benefits expected from those 
post-acquisition actions. Hence, we propose: 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): An acquirer’s acquisition experience mitigates the negative 
effects of legal protection of the target firm’s employee rights in the target country on 
target asset restructuring (H3a) and resource transfers (H3b).  
 
 
DATA AND METHODS 
Sample and Data Collection 
Our dataset includes information on post-acquisition asset restructuring and resource transfer 
processes at the firm level (Capron, 1999) and on corporate governance institutions at the 
national level (Schneper and Guillén, 2004). The data span 253 acquisitions undertaken by 
190 acquirers located in 14 countries and targets in 27 countries. The unit of analysis is the 
corporate acquisition.  
To study the micro-processes of post-acquisition asset restructuring and resource transfer, 
we gathered the data through a survey of North American and European companies. The 
initial sample frame consisted of 2,020 horizontal acquisitions undertaken between 1988 and 
1992 by manufacturing companies. Only acquisitions within the same four-digit US SIC 
industry were considered. The acquisitions included cases where the acquirers purchased 
entire corporations and cases in which acquirers purchased distinct business units from 
continuing corporations. We chose the period 1988-1992 in order to exclude both recent 
acquisitions in which post-acquisition decisions had not yet led to asset restructuring or 
resource transfers at the time of the survey, and older acquisitions for which managerial 
turnover made it difficult to gather detailed information about post-acquisition activities 
retrospectively. Information sources include the International Merger Yearbook (Securities 
Data Company, 1990, 1991, 1992), Mergers and Acquisitions Sourcebook (Juker, 1990, 
1991, 1992), Mergers and Acquisitions International (Investment Dealers Digest, 1990, 
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1991, 1992), and Fusions et Acquisitions (Magazine Fusions et Acquisitions, 1989, 1990, 
1991, 1992).  
We mailed the survey questionnaire2 during 1994 and 1995 to the acquiring companies 
included in the sample frame described above, and addressed to the chief executives of the 
business units that undertook the acquisition. In the cover letter, we asked for the survey to be 
completed either by the CEO or by a senior executive with overall responsibility for the 
acquisition. After the initial mailing, and following Dillman (1978), we mailed two follow-up 
letters and one replacement questionnaire. 
From the initial sample, we mailed questionnaires to 1,778 acquirers for whom we 
obtained addresses.  We received a  total of 273 completed questionnaires, representing a 
response rate of 16%. This response rate is reasonable, given the location of the potential 
respondents in more than a dozen countries in two continents, firm diversity, information 
sensitivity, and organizational positions (CEO, president, executive chair, vice president of 
finance, vice president of corporate development and managing director). The dataset has a 
broad distribution of acquirer and target firms. Almost half of the acquisitions took place in 
the chemical, food, and pharmaceutical industries. Acquirers tended to be larger than targets, 
including 60% listed as public companies. Most acquirer firms focused on one main business 
or were diversified in related businesses before the acquisition. Cross-border acquisitions 
represented 70% of the cases. More than 90% of the acquirers reside in France, the UK, the 
US, Germany, Sweden, Switzerland, and Belgium. More than 90% of the targets reside in 
France, the UK, the US, Germany, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden, Denmark, 
Switzerland, and Canada. 
                                                 
2
 Measurement scales were developed after reviewing the relevant literature and then pretested with a small 
group of academics and consultants. Preliminary versions of the questionnaire were pretested with senior 
executives from large US and European firms in charge of acquisition programs. Results from this phase led to 
the revision of several items to improve their clarity and the addition of a number of new items. On-site, face-to-
face interviews with CEOs or executives in charge of acquisition programs at 10 large firms from our sample 
produced further suggestions that were incorporated into the final version of the questionnaire. 
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We recognize that self-reported measures can carry some methodological limitations (for a 
discussion, see Dillman, 1978; Rossi, Wright, and Anderson, 1983). To limit potential biases 
associated with the survey method, we generated a rich corpus of measurement scales based 
on a review of the literature and on the on-site interviews with executives in charge of 
acquisitions in our sample. The survey contained multiple items measuring each construct, 
which were distributed throughout each section to avoid consistency bias. We also introduced 
several control questions at various points. To address possible response-style biases (e.g., 
“yea-saying”), we introduced items that were heterogeneous in content and worded some 
items positively and others negatively or scale-reversed (Baumgartner and Steenkamp, 2001). 
We deleted the few cases that exhibited a lack of convergence across similar questions. 
Finally, we did not use survey data to measure our two key independent variables: 
difference in shareholder rights between the acquirer and the target countries, and target 
country labor rights. Instead, we used indexes that have been extensively used in the 
institutional and economics literatures. By using different sources of information to build our 
dependent and independent variables, we reduced the potential impact of common-method 
bias, which always poses a threat to survey-based research (Podsakoff et al., 2003).  
Dependent Variables and Methods 
We assessed the effects of national corporate governance institutions on three types of 
dependent variable: (1) the extent of post-acquisition target restructuring, (2) the extent of 
post-acquisition transfers of acquirer resources to target and (3) the extent of post-acquisition 
transfers of target resources to acquirer. We measured the degree of post-acquisition target 
asset restructuring using an adapted version of the instrument developed by Datta (1991). We 
measured the extent to which the operations of the target firms were restructured along three 
main functions: R&D, manufacturing, and sales networks. We assessed the degree of 
restructuring for each function by taking the mean value from a set of three questions 
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pertaining to (1) the degree of capacity disposed of (closed or resold), (2) the degree of 
capacity restructured, and (3) the degree of personnel layoffs, measured on a seven-point 
continuous scale (1 = 0% restructured, 7 = 91-100% restructured). We assessed the reliability 
of each of the three target restructuring variables using Cronbach’s α on the three-item scale 
(disposal, restructuring, layoffs). Cronbach’s α ranged between 0.80 and 0.90, providing 
strong evidence for the reliability of our “target asset restructuring” measures.  
We used three types of resource-transfer variables to measure the extent to which the 
acquirer redeployed its own resources to the target firm. We drew on resource typologies to 
focus on three dimensions of resources: technology, marketing, and management (Morck and 
Yeung, 1992; Amit and Schoemaker, 1993). First, we measured the transfer of acquirer 
technical resources to the target by taking the average of two five-point scale items that 
measured the extent to which the acquirer transferred its own researchers and engineers to the 
target. Second, we measured the transfer of acquirer commercial resources to the target by 
using two five-point scale items that assessed the transfer of commercial and administrative 
staff from acquirer to target. Finally, we measured the transfer of acquirer managerial 
resources to the target by a five-point scale item that assessed the transfer of acquirer senior 
executives to the target firm. The obtained Cronbach’s α value varied between 0.74 and 0.77. 
We used the same type of variables to measure the extent to which the target transferred its 
resources to the acquirer.3 The obtained Cronbach’s α value varied between 0.82 and 0.90. 
Our dependent variables were continuous in nature and the data were cross-sectional. 
Therefore, we used Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) as the estimation method.  
Independent Variables 
                                                 
3
 Transfer of personnel or resources from target to acquirer (or from acquirer to target) does not necessarily 
imply that those employees/resources will move to the relevant home countries of the acquirer (or target). For 
instance, an acquirer buying a foreign target may have overlapping sites, branches, and offices with the target in 
its home market or in other geographical areas (such as in retail banking, cement, or the automobile industries). 
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We measured changes in shareholder rights after the merger by calculating the difference 
between acquirer country shareholder rights and target country shareholder rights. A positive 
value means that the target was acquired by a firm from a country that was more protective of 
shareholder rights. We used the time-varying country shareholder rights index developed by 
Schneper and Guillén (2004).4 For Hungary, a country not included in their database, we used 
the indexes developed by Pistor (2000), who calculated shareholder rights indexes for the 
former socialist countries during our period of study.  
We measured target country labor rights by using the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) time-varying Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) 
strictness index. For each country, employment protection legislation is described along 18 
basic items, which can be classified under three main areas: i) employment protection of 
regular workers against individual dismissal; ii) specific requirements for collective 
dismissals; and iii) regulation of temporary forms of employment. Starting from these 18 
basic pieces of information, a four-step procedure was developed for constructing cardinal 
summary indicators of EPL strictness that allow meaningful comparisons to be made, both 
across countries and between different years. We present a summary of the procedure to 
calculate the OECD EPL index in Table A of Appendix 1 (a full description of the items can 
be found in OECD Employment Outlook, 2004: 102-106).   
The EPL strictness index varies from zero to 6, with zero for countries with very low 
employment protection and 6 for countries with very strict employment protection legislation. 
                                                 
4
 They built on La Porta et al.’s (1998) cross-sectional index for 1996 and constructed a time-varying measure 
for each country during the period 1988-1998 by referring to a number of legal sources. Thus, their indicator 
covers the period to which our data refer, namely, 1988 through 1992. La Porta et al.’s (1998) cross-sectional 
index ranged from zero to 6 and was calculated by adding one point for the presence of a provision protecting 
six representative rights in the country’s commercial code or company law, namely: (1) allowing shareholders to 
mail their proxy vote at a shareholders’ general meeting; (2) not requiring shareholders to deposit their shares 
before attending the shareholders’ general meeting; (3) the presence of a legal mechanism enabling minority 
shareholders to challenge the decisions of management or assembly; (4) the ability to vote cumulatively on 
appointments to the board of directors (or to be guaranteed proportional representation); (5) preemptive rights 
for new share issues for all current shareholders; and (6) a minimum percentage of shareholder capital of 10% or 
less in order to call a special shareholders’ meeting. 
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There are large cross-country variations of the EPL index: it tends to be relatively low in the 
US (0.21), the UK (0.60), Canada (0.78) and Switzerland (1.10), while it is relatively high in 
the Netherlands (3.08), Germany (3.17), Spain and Portugal, both (4.10). It is interesting to 
note that Scandinavian countries, i.e., Norway and Sweden in our study, tend to score high 
both on investor protection (4 and 4) and labor protection (2.25 and 3.49 respectively). 
Denmark, Finland and France represent intermediary countries with an investor protection 
score of 3 and an EPL strictness index that varies between 2.30 and 2.93. A sharp contrast 
exists between Anglo-Saxon countries like the UK, Canada and the US with high investor 
protection (5 or 6) and low labor protection (below a value of 1) and Continental or Southern 
European countries like Germany, Belgium, and Greece with very low investor protection 
(between 0 and 2) and very restrictive labor legislation (above 3). Table 1 provides the 
acquirer country shareholder rights index and target country labor rights scores we used in 
our study. 
*** insert Table 1 here **** 
We measured the extent to which the acquirer’s experience could moderate the effects of 
target country labor rights on post-acquisition target asset restructuring and resource transfers 
by including in our model an interaction term calculated by multiplying acquirer M&A 
experience by target country labor rights. Acquisition experience is a self-reported measure 
of the number of acquisitions made by the acquirer within the five years preceding the 
acquisition of the specific target. To reduce the level of correlation between the interaction 
term and target country labor rights, we mean-centered the variables measuring target country 
labor rights and acquirer M&A experience.  
Control Variables 
We controlled for several other factors that could influence the level of post-acquisition target 
reorganization. Given our focus on country-level independent variables, we controlled for the 
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labor rights of the acquirer country. For instance, acquirers from countries with very 
restrictive labor legislation may use cross-border acquisitions to implement restructuring that 
would be very costly or not worth undertaking in their home country, or to acquire resources 
that they could not develop from their home base because of the difficulty of reshuffling 
resources to new uses in a flexible manner.  
We controlled for interaction effects between the labor rights in the target country and the 
differences in the shareholder rights of the previous owner’s country and those in the country 
of the new owner (i.e., the acquirer). In their study of restructuring decisions of poorly 
performing firms, Atanassov and Kim (2008) find suggestive evidence of an interaction 
effect between labor rights and shareholder rights; in particular, they find that management 
turnover is lower when collective relations laws are stronger, with the relation being 
significant only for firms located in countries with poor investor protection. We therefore 
added the interaction of the target country labor rights and the acquirer’s relative shareholder 
rights among the control variables. If an acquirer is from a country giving stronger 
shareholder rights protection than the previous owner of the target, the acquirer will be under 
more pressure to engage in asset restructuring and resource transfers, regardless of the 
target’s labor rights situation. 
We controlled for whether the acquisition was domestic or cross-border (using a dummy 
variable that took the value of 1 for cross-border acquisitions). Cross-border mergers may 
increase the difficulty of exerting stakeholder rights due to a more complex post-acquisition 
process. At the same time, cross-border mergers may entail greater target reorganization due 
to institutional arbitrage opportunities. We also controlled for the extent to which the 
acquisition took place in a growing or a declining industry. We used a five-point scale 
measure for “domestic industry growth”, ranging from “rapidly growing” to “rapidly 
declining”, and then reversed the scale. We used a five-point scale measure for “international 
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industry growth”, ranging from “rapidly growing” to “rapidly declining”, and then reversed 
the scale. 
We controlled for acquirer motive by a comprehensive set of measures (1-5 scale): 1) 
accessing new markets, 2) accessing new geographical markets, 3) achieving manufacturing 
economies of scale, 4) acquiring complementary resources from the target, 5) transferring 
resources to the target, 6) reducing overcapacity, 7) reducing financial risk, 8) turning around 
the target, and 9) preventing a rival from buying the target firm. We controlled for the target 
and acquirer firms’ pre-acquisition profitability. We measured pre-acquisition profitability 
relative to the industry average by using a five-point scale that ranged from “much more 
profitable” to “much less profitable”. We then reversed the scale of the two variables. We 
also controlled for the relative annual sales of target to acquirer, using a five-point scale (with 
1 indicating a relative size of the target to the acquirer of less than 25% and 5 greater than 
100%) and whether the target was public (i.e., stock-listed).5 
We also controlled for the possibility that shareholder and labor rights not only influence 
post-acquisition target reorganization but also the occurrence of a merger or acquisition in the 
first place. In order to correct for this selection issue, we calculated the predicted number of 
M&As for a sample of 46 target countries with complete data on both sides of the equation. 
The dependent variable was the number of M&As reported in the SDC-Platinum database. 
We ran a negative binomial regression using shareholder rights, labor rights, GDP per capita, 
GDP growth, stock market capitalization, and the labor force (to account for size) as the 
independent variables. We report the estimates of this country selection model in Table 2. We 
found that M&A activity in a country is positively associated with the strength of shareholder 
                                                 
5
 Although the target shareholders’ incentives can also depend on the transaction financing (cash versus stock), 
we do not include this variable as a control in our study because of the specificities of our sample. In the 
subsample of 80 acquisitions for which we obtained the information, 76% of the acquisitions were fully paid in 
cash and in 90% of the acquisitions, cash was used as the dominant mode of payment. Also note that most of the 
acquisitions were made in cash during the study period.  
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rights and negatively correlated with the strength of labor rights. GDP per capita and GDP 
growth positively influence the level of M&A activity in a country. We included the 
predicted number of M&As in each target country as an additional control in all of the 
regressions on post-acquisition reorganization.6  
*** insert Table 2 here *** 
 
RESULTS 
The descriptive statistics of the independent and control variables are presented in Table 3. 
Most of the bivariate correlations are small. The correlation between target labor rights and 
the difference in shareholder rights between the acquirer and target countries, however, is 
positive and large. The potential multicollinearity problem, however, did not manifest itself 
in the form of unstable parameter estimates or large standard errors. The correlations between 
the predicted number of M&As and the two aforementioned variables were large and 
negative. Excluding the predicted number of M&As from the regression, however, would 
have prevented us from controlling for the possibility that acquirers select target countries 
based on the degree of protection of shareholder or labor rights.  
**** insert Table 3 here**** 
 
Table 4 presents the regression results. Models 1 through 3 show the effects of investor 
and labor rights protection on post-acquisition target firm restructuring concerning R&D, 
manufacturing, and sales networks, respectively. Models 4 through 6 show the results for the 
post-acquisition transfers of the acquirer’s technology, marketing, and managerial resources 
to the target. Finally, Models 7 through 9 present the results for post-acquisition transfers of 
the target’s technology, marketing and managerial resources to the acquirer. 
                                                 
6
 It should be noted that we cannot control for the additional selection issue of acquirers’ preference for target 
companies that offer restructuring opportunities above those that do not. Unfortunately, the SDC-Platinum 
database does not include information on those aspects. 
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**** insert Table 4 here*** 
We found support for H1a on the effect of shareholder rights differences on target asset 
restructuring. Controlling for industry growth, acquisition motive, and pre-acquisition 
profitability, among other variables, we found that as the new owner comes from a country 
with better-protected shareholder rights, the target experiences more restructuring in its R&D, 
manufacturing, and sales network. In contrast, we found partial support for H1b on the effect 
of shareholder rights on the transfer of resources. We obtained robust support for the role of 
shareholder rights on the transfer of target resources to acquirer. We did not find a significant 
relationship between shareholder rights differences and resource transfer to the target 
(although this relationship becomes marginally significant in the AMOS model – see below). 
Altogether, these results suggest that stronger pressure from investors not only generates 
more restructuring at the target but also higher leverage of the target’s resources. These 
results also provide a more nuanced assessment of the role of shareholders, who are 
commonly viewed as focusing on cost cutting rather than on innovation and capability 
enhancement. Our results suggest that shareholder pressure can have an effect on both types 
of post-acquisition action.  
Our results lend systematic support for H2a and H2b on the impact of labor rights 
protection. When the rights of the target’s employees in the target country are better 
protected, the target will witness less restructuring of either R&D or manufacturing (H2a), 
and fewer resource transfers of technology, marketing, or management to and from the target 
(H2b). It is important to note that the strength of labor rights in the target country has an 
effect not only on the extent of post-acquisition asset restructuring but also on resource 
transfers. These findings are in line with previous studies of labor rights, which found that the 
strength of labor rights not only affects restructuring but also new investments and growth. 
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We found support for H3a on the moderating effect of M&A experience. The results 
suggest that the M&A experience of the acquirer may mitigate the negative effects of target 
country labor rights on post-acquisition target restructuring. We also found partial support for 
H2b: the acquirer’s M&A experience helps mitigate the negative effects of target country 
labor rights on post-acquisition resource transfers to the target, although our analysis 
indicates a non-significant effect on resource transfers to the acquirer. These results suggest 
that experience helps the acquirer to find ways of minimizing workforce resistance. 
Capturing new resources from the target might be more complex, more idiosyncratic and less 
subject to the experience effect.   
Interestingly, we found a positive and significant main effect of experience on the extent 
to which the acquirer restructures the target’s manufacturing assets (Model 2) and sales 
networks (Model 3), as well as on the extent to which it transfers its commercial (Model 5) 
and managerial (Model 6) resources to the target. Among other control variables, we also 
found that the labor rights in the acquirer country were positively associated with the resource 
transfers from target to acquirer (Models 7, 8 and 9). This result is consistent with the 
literature on cross-border labor solidarity at multinational firms, which suggests that if labor 
has power in the home country, the acquirer is more likely to enhance the value of the target 
by transferring resources than by downsizing (Guillén 2001: 123-156). We also note some 
interaction effects between labor rights in the target country and the differences in 
shareholder rights of the previous owner and those of the new owner (notably for Models 1 
and 8). In addition, we found a positive and significant relationship between acquirer motive 
for turning around the target and the extent of post-acquisition restructuring. In contrast, 
acquirer motive for entering a new geographical market is negatively associated with post-
acquisition restructuring. Industry growth is positively associated with post-acquisition 
resource transfers. Profitable acquirers are more likely to restructure unprofitable targets and 
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transfer resources to assist the development of profitable targets. Finally, the predicted 
number of M&As in the target country was also found to be significant in Models 1, 3, 5 and 
6. 
We conducted supplementary analyses to ensure the robustness of our results and found 
qualitatively unchanged results. First, we performed regressions using another index of labor 
protection developed by Kucera (2002) at the International Labour Organization (ILO). This 
is a measure that captures the violations of the right to free association and collective 
bargaining (FACB). In the context of our study, we rescaled the values of the FACB rights 
violations to obtain our measure of labor rights. The rescaled index varies from 0 to 10. For 
instance, Germany has a score of 0.53 with Kucera’s FACB rights violation score; its labor 
rights score becomes 9.47. The United States has a score of 5.26 with Kucera’s FACB rights 
violation score; its labor rights score became 4.74. The correlation between the OECD EPL 
index and the rescaled ILO FACB is 0.85. The results remained qualitatively unchanged.  
We also performed regressions on the subsample of cross-border acquisitions (N = 177, 
71% of the total sample). We found a similar pattern of results, with the interaction term 
between target labor rights and acquirer experience becoming even more significant in a few 
models (Models 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8).  
To further control for self-selection into specific countries due to differences in 
shareholder and labor rights protection, we also ran a model including a control for the level 
of foreign direct investment inflow into the target country during our study period. This 
variable was significantly correlated with the level of M&A activity in the country (r = 0.42, 
p< 0.001). The inclusion of this additional variable did not change the rest of our results. 
Finally, we added dummy variables accounting for the year of the acquisition and obtained 
similar results. 
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We also estimated a model including a dummy variable capturing whether the acquiring 
firm had made only one acquisition in our sample (i.e., it returned only one survey about one 
specific target) or had made more than one acquisition (i.e., it returned several surveys about 
several different targets). We did not find any qualitative differences in our results. We also 
added some dummies to control for the length of time that elapsed between the acquisitions 
and the informants’ depiction of them. The time elapsed varied from three to five years. We 
found no significant effect. 
The standardized coefficients reported in Table 4 for asset restructuring (Models 1, 2 and 
3) for the three key variables of interest indicate that, when both shareholder and labor rights 
are significant, the negative effect of labor rights is greater in magnitude than the positive 
effect of the differences in shareholder rights. These two effects are of similar magnitude for 
resource transfers to target (see Table 4, Models 4, 5 and 6). The magnitude of the 
standardized interaction effect between labor rights and acquirer experience is so large that a 
standard deviation increase in acquisition experience – i.e., gaining experience with 6.62 
more acquisitions – offsets the negative effect of a standard deviation increase in labor rights 
for Model 2, and nearly offsets this effect for Model 6.  
In addition to the OLS estimations reported in Table 4 (Models 1-9), we also ran three 
specifications (Models 10-12 of Table 5) employing structural equation modeling (SEM). We 
used this approach because the data on the dependent variables come from a survey with 
multiple items representing different facets of post-acquisition target reorganization. In 
Model 10, the dependent variable, “Target restructuring” (η1), is a construct consisting of the 
three “target restructuring” items that were used in Models 1 (R&D), 2 (manufacturing) and 3 
(sales networks), with respective loadings of 0.72, 0.84 and 1 (α = 0.65). In Model 11, the 
dependent variable, “Resource transfer to target” (η2), is a construct consisting of the three 
“resource transfer to target” items that were used in Models 4 (technology), 5 (marketing) 
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and 6 (management), with respective loadings of 0.67, 0.91 and 1 (α = 0.76). In Model 12, 
the dependent variable, “Resource transfer to acquirer” (η3), is a construct consisting of the 
three “resource transfer to acquirer” items that were used in Models 7 (technology), 8 
(marketing) and 9 (management), with respective loadings of 0.42, 1 and 0.72 (α = 0.65). 
Given the multi-faceted nature of our constructs, we obtained good loadings for each 
construct except η3. In order to explore this problem further, we re-ran the analysis in Model 
12 without the item whose loading was 0.42, and our results did not change.  
**** Insert Table 5 about here*** 
 
Our results fully support H1 and H2 and tend to be stronger (at two-tailed tests) than the 
results we obtained throughout Models 1-9 using OLS. We obtained some variation for H3. 
In the SEM analyses, the interaction of acquisition experience with labor rights had a 
significant effect only on “Resource transfer to target” (η2), whereas in OLS regressions it 
also had a significant effect on target restructuring (Models 1-3). We also ran a baseline 
model (i.e., without the hypothesized independent variables), and the R2 dropped from 44% to 
35% in Model 10, from 41% to 16% in Model 11, and from 48% to 38% in Model 12, all of 
which are highly significant.  
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Although post-acquisition reorganization is quintessentially a micro process of change, we 
have found evidence for our argument  that the extent of target asset restructuring and 
resource transfers depends on the nature of regulatory macro institutions, an insight that had 
not been previously pursued by strategy scholars. We examined the characteristics of national 
systems of corporate governance to theorize about the nature of the shareholders’ and 
employees’ interests when it comes to reorganization, under the assumption that the firm is 
coalitional in nature. Using a cross-national dataset of corporate acquisitions and post-
acquisition reorganization, we found support for our predictions that stronger legal protection 
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of shareholder rights in the acquirer country compared to the target country increases the 
acquirer’s ability to restructure the target’s assets and leverage the target’s resources, while 
the protection of employee rights in the target country restricts the acquirer’s ability to 
restructure the target’s assets and transfer resources to and from the target.  
In finding a robust effect of macro regulatory institutions on micro-level decisions and 
outcomes, we have further developed and advanced a key insight of institutional theory, 
namely that economic action is embedded in dynamics of interest, power and influence. Post-
acquisition reorganization lends itself to theorizing this important aspect of institutional 
analysis because of its intrinsic potential for conflict. We have also found that experienced 
acquirers partially mitigate the negative effects of target labor rights on target asset 
restructuring and resource transfers. This finding is consistent with theories of experiential 
learning, highlighting that a situation in which experience is beneficial in that it enables the 
firm to navigate better an institutional environment. It is also congruent with the resource-
based view of the firm and its assumption of firm heterogeneity because firms with 
experience have a capability that enables them to overcome institutional obstacles. 
Institutional theory can benefit from the insights of experiential learning theory and the 
resource-based view because institutions are internalized by economic actors in different 
ways, especially in the case of macro institutions like corporate governance rules and 
regulations.  
While strategy scholars have made important contributions using institutional theory to 
study competitive strategy in general, and M&As in particular, previous research has not 
applied a similar approach to post-acquisition dynamics. Our theoretical and empirical 
analysis presents yet another way in which institutional theory can be brought to bear on 
important strategy issues. The finding that micro-level decisions and processes are affected 
by macro institutions has implications for both strategy research and practice. The concept of 
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the competitive environment needs to be expanded to include not only industry aspects but 
also national institutions. Firms operate in a nested environment, which in turn can be shaped 
by their political strategies (Bonardi, Hillman, Keim, 2005; Capron and Chatain, 2008). 
Undertaking research without acknowledging this important fact runs the risk of specification 
error, and making actual business decisions ignoring the implications of national institutions 
could lead firms seriously astray. 
It is important to note that our theoretical explanation for the negative effect of target 
employees’ resistance to post-acquisition reorganization is qualitatively different from that 
offered by previous research in strategy. Scholars have tended to attribute employees’ 
negative emotions and attitudes to cultural misfit, loss of organizational identity, fear of job 
losses, or the acquirer’s lack of fairness (Ranft and Lord, 2002; Larsson and Finkelstein, 
1999). Past research has not examined “the conditions under which target employees could 
actually exert their power in the acquisition process and successfully oppose shareholders’ 
interests”. Our findings suggest that the political balance between acquirer shareholders and 
target employees depends, to a certain extent, on the institutional characteristics of both 
acquirer and target countries.  
Our empirical results have some managerial implications. They suggest that managers 
need to take the role of national governance institutions into account when making 
acquisitions. Acquiring firms should strive to assess the impact of those legal variables on the 
expected cash flows and to factor them into the target price. On the one hand, national 
governance institutions can prevent the acquirer from making necessary post-acquisition 
changes, and so the target price should be discounted to account for that risk. On the other 
hand, acquirers may create value in cross-border acquisitions due to institutional arbitrage 
opportunities, and so the target price should be adjusted upwards to account for those 
opportunities. Acquirers from a shareholder-friendly country who buy a target from a less 
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shareholder-protective environment have opportunities for value creation by enforcing value-
creating changes at the target. In the same vein, an acquirer that is highly constrained by a 
restrictive labor regulation can acquire firms in countries with less restrictive labor regulation 
in order to implement strategies based on asset restructuring or resource recombination that 
would not be easily implemented in its home country. Also merging firms can create a new 
combined governance system in order to leverage the best of their respective institutional 
environment. This is illustrated by Lenovo’s acquisition of the IBM Personal Computer 
Business and the borrowing of many elements from the American governance system to 
manage the newly merged entity. 
Our theoretical and empirical analyses have several limitations. First, our study is 
restricted to post-merger target asset restructuring and resource transfer decisions in 
horizontal M&As. In this specific and potentially tense context, employment protection may 
diminish acquirers’ ability to cope with the need for substantial and rapid labor force 
adjustments. Our arguments do not imply that labor protection systematically hinders 
shareholders’ interests and economic returns. Several studies have shown that stable 
employment relationships may promote workers’ efforts, cooperation, and investment in 
firm-specific human capital, which may enhance productivity and create value, notably in 
industries with a cumulative knowledge base (Bassanini and Ernst, 2002).   
Second, we used survey data to capture micro-level processes of post-acquisition target 
reorganization. As with any survey-based data, concerns about accuracy of retrospective data 
and desirability bias may arise (Sudman and Bradburn, 1973; Golden, 1992). Third, we 
examined post-acquisition processes that took place during the 1990s. To ensure the 
relevance of our results, we examined how the institutional variables used in our model have 
evolved in the last decade. The EPL strictness index has remained relatively unchanged over 
the past decade, with a correlation of 0.91 between the 1990 index and the 2003 index. The 
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same observation holds for shareholder rights, for which we observe a correlation of 0.95 
between the index of the early 1990s and the index of the early 2000s. The persistent nature 
of cross-country institutional differences indicates that acquirers making acquisitions today 
are very likely to face similar constraints to those faced by acquirers in the 1990s. 
Fourth, we focused our analysis on the institutional attributes of the merging firms’ 
countries. Research has also found other country-level factors such as political, cultural, 
ideological, historical, and technological variables or intellectual property protection regimes 
to affect firm-level strategy and performance outcomes (Oxley, 1999; Henisz, 2000; Kogut, 
Walker, and Anand, 2002; Delios and Henisz, 2003; Davis, 2005; Fiss and Zajac, 2004). 
Finally, we focused on country-level variation in governance systems to capture a 
phenomenon that is likely to be a combination of country (Hall and Soskice, 2001), region 
(Saxenian, 1994), industry (Herrigel, 1996), and firm-level characteristics (Westphal and 
Zajac, 1998; Wulf, 2004; Capron and Shen, 2007).  
These limitations offer avenues for future research on the relationship between corporate 
governance institutions and M&As. Our paper represents just a first step in our understanding 
of the complexity of the relationship between firm-level governance systems, micro-level 
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Coding of Shareholder and Labor Rights
Acquirer Country Shareholder Rights Target Country Shareholder Rights Labor Rights 
Schneper & Guillén index (2004) Schneper & Guillén index (2004)  EPL Strictness Index
Based on La Porta et al . (1998) Based on La Porta et al.  (1998) OECD (2004)
0-6 Index (0= lowest; 6= highest) 0-6 Index (0= lowest; 6= highest) 0-6 index (0=lowest; 6=highest)
Austria 2 Australia 4 0.94
Belgium 0 Austria 2 2.21
Canada 5 Belgium 0 3.15
Denmark 3 Brazil 5 na
Finland 3 Canada 5 0.78
France 3 Colombia 3 na
Germany 1 Czechoslovakia 4 1.90
Italy 1 Denmark 3 2.30
Netherlands 2 Finland 3 2.33
Norway 4 France 3 2.98
Sweden 4 Germany 1 3.17
Switzerland 1 Greece 2 3.60
United Kingdom 5 Hungary 2.5 1.27











United Kingdom 5 0.60






Table 2  
Negative Binomial Regressions Predicting the Number of M&As by Country 
 Number of M&As in target country 
Variable   
Target country shareholder rights 0.18* 
 (0.13) 
Target country labor rights -0.24*** 
 (0.09) 
Target country GDP per capita 0.01*** 
 (0.01) 
Target country GDP growth 0.09*** 
 (0.04) 
Target country stock market capitalization -0.01 
 (0.01) 




Log Likelihood (Chi², 5 df; p value) -212.39 (74.96, p < .001) 
n 45 
*Standard errors of regression coefficients are in parentheses.    







Sample Descriptive Statistics and Correlations (N = 253)
Variables Mean St. Dev. Minimum Maximum 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1.  Difference in acquirer-target shareholder rights 0.03 2.09 -6.00 5.00
2. Target country labor rights1 0.00 2.35 -7.40 2.60 0.54
3. Target country labor rights x acquirer M&A experience1 0.64 14.64 -106.77 76.46 0.11 -0.01
4.  Acquirer M&A Experience1 0.00 6.62 -4.92 45.08 0.09 0.04 0.08
5.  Acquirer country labor rights 2.01 1.15 0.20 3.60 -0.44 0.18 -0.11 -0.08
6. Target country labor rights x difference in acquirer target shareholder rights 0.12 0.22 -0.25 0.25 -0.22 -0.26 -0.20 -0.05 0.91
7.  Cross-border acquisition 0.71 0.46 0.00 1.00 -0.01 0.03 0.00 0.23 0.16 -0.23
8.  Domestic industry growth 2.42 0.96 1.00 5.00 -0.01 -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 -0.09 -0.10 -0.13
9.  International domestic growth 2.18 0.92 1.00 5.00 -0.05 0.04 0.02 -0.03 -0.15 -0.05 -0.16 0.62
10.  Acquisition motive: Access to new products 3.40 1.45 1.00 5.00 -0.02 -0.05 0.09 -0.09 -0.12 0.12 -0.25 -0.05 0.03
11.  Acquisition motive: New market entry 3.65 1.54 1.00 5.00 -0.01 -0.10 -0.03 0.08 0.01 -0.13 0.44 0.05 0.13
12. Acquisition motive: Manufacturing scale economies 2.38 1.29 1.00 5.00 -0.16 -0.09 -0.09 -0.15 0.11 0.08 -0.14 -0.05 0.02
13.  Acquisition motive: Acquisition of resources 2.50 1.32 1.00 5.00 -0.01 -0.10 0.02 -0.22 -0.14 0.09 -0.18 -0.03 0.01
14. Acquisition motive: Transfer of resources 2.12 1.22 1.00 5.00 -0.01 -0.07 -0.03 0.03 0.01 -0.11 0.09 0.03 0.03
15. Acquisition motive: Reduction of overcapacity 1.42 0.91 1.00 5.00 -0.05 0.08 0.02 -0.08 0.13 0.03 -0.05 -0.18 -0.18
16. Acquisition motive: Reduction of financial risk 1.58 0.98 1.00 5.00 -0.05 -0.12 0.17 0.00 -0.14 0.05 -0.14 0.08 0.07
17. Acquisition motive: Turning around a failing firm 1.73 1.22 1.00 5.00 -0.02 -0.02 0.03 -0.16 -0.01 0.08 -0.19 -0.25 -0.19
18. Acquisition motive: Block a rival 2.36 1.42 1.00 5.00 -0.10 0.03 0.05 -0.04 0.14 -0.03 0.12 0.02 -0.19
19. Acquisition motive: Pre-merger target profitability 2.90 1.10 1.00 5.00 -0.03 -0.08 -0.03 0.19 -0.06 -0.05 0.09 0.17 0.21
20. Acquisition motive: Pre-merger acquirer profitability 2.35 0.94 1.00 5.00 0.04 0.05 -0.01 0.08 -0.04 -0.02 0.01 0.03 0.12
21. Relative annual sales of target to acquirer 1.92 1.29 1.00 5.00 -0.12 -0.11 0.01 -0.10 0.04 0.20 -0.13 -0.23 -0.05
22. Public acquirer 0.40 0.49 0.00 1.00 0.04 -0.09 0.04 0.06 -0.16 -0.11 0.19 0.06 0.02
23. Predicted # of M&As in target country 1483 2700 1.00 7445 -0.43 -0.55 -0.04 0.02 -0.21 0.28 -0.03 0.14 0.08
24. Acquirer country shareholder rights2 3.43 1.63 0.00 6.00 0.55 -0.19 0.12 0.06 -0.79 -0.07 -0.16 0.09 0.12
25. Target country shareholder rights2 3.39 1.82 0.00 6.00 -0.66 -0.79 -0.02 -0.05 -0.20 0.19 -0.15 0.06 0.04
1 To calculate the interaction variable, we mean-centered the variables measuring target labor rights and acquirer M&A experience.
2





Sample Descriptive Statistics and Correlations (N = 253)
Variables 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
1.  Difference in acquirer-target shareholder rights
2. Target country labor rights1
3. Target country labor rights x acquirer M&A experience1
4.  Acquirer M&A Experience1
5.  Acquirer country labor rights
6. Target country labor rights x difference in acquirer target shareholder rights
7.  Cross-border acquisition
8.  Domestic industry growth
9.  International domestic growth
10.  Acquisition motive: Access to new products
11.  Acquisition motive: New market entry -0.21
12. Acquisition motive: Manufacturing scale economies 0.06 -0.05
13.  Acquisition motive: Acquisition of resources 0.29 -0.11 0.16
14. Acquisition motive: Transfer of resources -0.02 0.09 0.04 0.18
15. Acquisition motive: Reduction of overcapacity -0.06 -0.02 0.29 -0.05 0.08
16. Acquisition motive: Reduction of financial risk 0.18 0.09 0.12 0.12 0.14 0.12
17. Acquisition motive: Turning around a failing firm 0.10 -0.04 0.02 0.09 0.10 0.19 0.21
18. Acquisition motive: Block a rival -0.20 0.10 0.20 0.11 0.08 0.29 0.05 0.13
19. Acquisition motive: Pre-merger target profitability -0.03 0.10 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.13 0.03 -0.41 -0.15
20. Acquisition motive: Pre-merger acquirer profitability 0.18 0.01 -0.12 0.02 0.01 0.07 0.01 -0.05 -0.01 -0.05
21. Relative annual sales of target to acquirer 0.10 -0.02 0.37 0.08 -0.04 0.20 0.12 0.06 -0.05 0.07 -0.14
22. Public acquirer -0.06 0.10 -0.12 -0.08 0.06 0.02 -0.04 -0.04 0.02 -0.06 0.04 -0.03
23. Predicted # of M&As in target country -0.08 0.09 0.03 0.11 0.07 -0.03 0.11 -0.11 0.01 -0.03 -0.11 0.17 0.14
24. Acquirer country shareholder rights2 0.08 0.01 -0.07 0.12 0.02 -0.09 0.12 -0.01 -0.14 0.06 -0.02 0.02 0.12 0.22
25. Target country shareholder rights2 0.09 0.02 0.13 0.12 0.03 -0.03 0.17 0.02 0.00 0.08 -0.07 0.16 0.06 0.67 0.27
1 To calculate the interaction variable, we mean-centered the variables measuring target labor rights and acquirer M&A experience.
2
 This variable is not directly included in our model. We included it in the correlation table for informative purpose. 
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Table 4
OLS Regressions Predicting Post-Acquisition Reorganization
Post-Acquisition Target Firm Restructuring1:
R&D Manufacturing Sales Networks
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Difference in acquirer-target shareholder rights 0.41* 0.10* 0.40***
(0.26) (0.07) (0.22)
0.19* 0.18* 0.21***
Target country labor rights -0.54*** -0.38*** -0.56***
(0.22) (0.15) (0.17)
-0.41*** -0.40*** -0.49***
Target country labor rights*Acquirer M&A Experience 0.09* 0.03*** 0.11***
(0.06) (0.01) (0.05)
0.15* 0.42*** 0.26***
Acquirer M&A Experience 0.00 0.02*** 0.01
(0.04) (0.01) (0.03)
Acquirer country labor rights 0.05 -0.04 0.16
(0.17) (0.13) (0.14)
Target country labor rights*Difference in acquirer-target shareholder rights 1.14˜ 0.01 -0.59
(0.78) (0.51) (0.65)
Cross-border acquisition 0.41 0.66*** -0.16
(0.46) (0.28) (0.37)
Domestic industry growth -0.10 -0.18 -0.01
(0.24) (0.15) (0.19)
International industry growth -0.09 -0.19 -0.15
(0.24) (0.15) (0.19)
Acquisition motive: Access to new products 0.03 -0.15** -0.11
(0.12) (0.08) (0.11)
Acquisition motive: New market entry -0.25*** -0.39*** -.25***
(0.12) (0.08) (0.10)
Acquisition motive: Manufacturing scale economies 0.03 -0.06 0.20
(0.11) (0.09) (0.17)
Acquisition motive: Acquisition of resources -0.13 0.07 -0.12
(0.12) (0.07) (0.14)
Acquisition motive: Transfer of resources 0.14 -0.03 0.30***
(0.14) (0.09) (0.11)
Acquisition motive: Reduction of overcapacity -0.01 -0.08 0.17
(0.26) (0.15) (0.20)
Acquisition motive: Reduction of financial risk -0.18 -0.04 -0.25*
(0.18) (0.11) (0.15)
Acquisition motive: Turning around a failing firm 0.22* 0.23*** -0.17
(0.16) (0.10) (0.16)
Acquisition motive: Block a rival 0.41*** 0.30*** 0.11
(0.13) (0.08) (0.13)
Pre-merger target profitability -0.07 -0.07 -0.17*
(0.11) (0.09) (0.12)
Pre-merger acquirer profitability 0.37* 0.29*** 0.40***
(0.24) (0.15) (0.19)
Relative annual sales of target to acquirer 0.14 0.09 -0.04
(0.15) (0.08) (0.11)
Public acquirer 0.20 -0.32* -0.41*
(0.34) (0.21) (0.29)
Predicted # of M&As in target country (selection model)2 -1.49** 0.16 -0.11
(0.08) (0.46) (0.01)
Constant 2.81 3.52 3.77
(1.27) (0.71) (1.02)
R2 21.60% 41.3% 30.3%
n 253 253 253
1
 Standard errors of regression coefficients are shown in parentheses.  
For our three theoretical independent variables, the standardized regression coefficients are shown in italics beneath the standard error.
2 The number of M&As was predicted using the model reported in Table 2. The regression coefficient and its standard error 
for this variable has been multiplied by 10000.
*p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .10; one-tailed tests. 
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Table 4 (Cont'd)
OLS Regressions Predicting Post-Acquisition Reorganization
Post-Acquisition Transfer of  Acquirer Resources to Target1:
Technology Marketing Management
Variables Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Difference in acquirer-target shareholder rights 0.04 0.13 -0.02
(0.14) (0.17) (0.18)
0.03 0.08 -0.01
Target country labor rights -0.20*** -0.29*** -0.33***
(0.11) (0.13) (0.14)
-0.26*** -0.30*** -0.31***
Target country labor rights*Acquirer M&A Experience 0.01* 0.01* 0.02***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
0.14* 0.14* 0.23***
Acquirer M&A Experience 0.01 0.02* 0.05***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Acquirer country labor rights 0.08 0.12 0.13
(0.09) (0.11) (0.12)
Target country labor rights*Difference in acquirer-target shareholder rights 0.23 -0.46 -0.32
(0.41) (0.48) (0.53)
Cross-border acquisition -0.27 -0.20 -0.47*
(0.22) (0.25) (0.28)
Domestic industry growth 0.02 0.19* 0.17
(0.11) (0.13) (0.15)
International industry growth -0.13 -0.12 -0.18
(0.12) (0.14) (0.15)
Acquisition motive: Access to new products 0.06 0.13** 0.06
(0.07) (0.07) (0.08)
Acquisition motive: New market entry -0.02 -0.04 0.07
(0.07) (0.07) (0.08)
Acquisition motive: Manufacturing scale economies -0.01 0.06 -0.12
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Acquisition motive: Acquisition of resources -0.03 -0.03 0.02
(0.08) (0.08) (0.09)
Acquisition motive: Transfer of resources 0.09 0.12* 0.03
(0.08) (0.08) (0.09)
Acquisition motive: Reduction of overcapacity 0.20*** 0.13 0.13
(0.10) (0.11) (0.13)
Acquisition motive: Reduction of financial risk -0.04 0.04 -0.15*
(0.10) (0.10) (0.12)
Acquisition motive: Turning around a failing firm -0.06 -0.01 -.17**
(0.08) (0.09) (0.09)
Acquisition motive: Block a rival 0.10* 0.06 0.05
(0.07) (0.07) (0.08)
Pre-merger target profitability -0.17*** -0.12** -0.28***
(0.08) (0.09) (0.10)
Pre-merger acquirer profitability -0.05 0.10 0.01
(0.10) (0.10) (0.11)
Relative annual sales of target to acquirer 0.09 0.14* 0.12*
(0.08) (0.08) (0.09)
Public acquirer 0.37*** 0.18 0.33*
(0.17) (0.19) (0.22)
Predicted # of M&As in target country (selection model)2 -0.21 -0.74* -1.08***
(0.43) (0.51) (0.57)
Constant 1.01 0.73 1.55
(0.65) (0.76) (0.84)
R2 16.3% 16.4% 16.9%
n 253 253 253
1Standard errors of regression coefficients are shown in parentheses beneath unstandardized regression coefficients. 
For our three theoretical independent variables, the standardized regression coefficients are shown in italics beneath the standard error.
2 The number of M&As was predicted using the model reported in Table 2. The regression coefficient and its standard error 
for this variable has been multiplied by 10000.




OLS Regressions Predicting Post-Acquisition Reorganization
Post-Acquisition Transfer of Target Resources to Acquirer 1:
Technology Marketing Management
Variables Model 7 Model 8 Model 9
Difference in acquirer-target shareholder rights 0.17*** 0.27*** 0.11***
(0.08) (0.09) (0.06)
0.27*** 0.39*** 0.22***
Target country labor rights -0.23* -0.35*** -0.19***
(0.15) (0.16) (0.10)
-0.23* -0.31*** -0.26***
Target country labor rights*Acquirer M&A Experience -0.29 -0.68 0.00
(0.52) (0.60) (0.00)
-0.05 -0.11 0.00
Acquirer M&A Experience 0.20 -0.09 0.00
(0.25) (0.29) (0.00)
Acquirer country labor rights 0.20* 0.39*** 0.15*
(0.14) (0.15) (0.10)
Target country labor rights*Difference in acquirer-target shareholder rights -0.13 0.79* 0.25
(0.52) (0.58) (0.35)
Cross-border acquisition -0.06 0.27 0.01
(0.27) (0.32) (0.18)
Domestic industry growth 0.07 -0.28** 0.19***
(0.14) (0.17) (0.10)
International industry growth 0.13 0.36*** -0.03
(0.15) (0.17) (0.10)
Acquisition motive: Access to new products 0.13** 0.34*** 0.03
(0.07) (0.09) (0.05)
Acquisition motive: New market entry -0.02 -0.02 0.07*
(0.07) (0.09) (0.05)
Acquisition motive: Manufacturing scale economies 0.03 0.35*** 0.10*
(0.09) (0.10) (0.06)
Acquisition motive: Acquisition of resources 0.08 -0.10 0.11***
(0.08) (0.10) (0.06)
Acquisition motive: Transfer of resources 0.04 0.12 0.03
(0.08) (0.10) (0.06)
Acquisition motive: Reduction of overcapacity 0.21** 0.34** 0.13**
(0.13) (0.18) (0.08)
Acquisition motive: Reduction of financial risk 0.08 -0.21* 0.09
(0.11) (0.13) (0.07)
Acquisition motive: Turning around a failing firm 0.03 0.15* -0.01
(0.09) (0.11) (0.06)
Acquisition motive: Block a rival 0.06 -0.03 0.02
(0.08) (0.09) (0.05)
Pre-merger target profitability 0.01 -0.01 0.10*
(0.10) (0.09) (0.06)
Pre-merger acquirer profitability 0.02 -0.05 -0.05
(0.10) (0.12) (0.10)
Relative annual sales of target to acquirer 0.18*** 0.02 0.18***
(0.09) (0.10) (0.06)
Public acquirer -0.16 -0.03 -0.03
(0.21) (0.25) (0.14)
Predicted # of M&As in target country (selection model)2 0.04 0.01 -0.06
(0.05) (0.05) (0.01)
Constant 1.02 0.75 0.55
(0.68) (0.77) (0.48)
R2 17.7% 39.4% 29.1%
n 253 253 253
1Standard errors of regression coefficients are shown in parentheses beneath unstandardized regression coefficients. 
For our three theoretical independent variables, the standardized regression coefficients are shown in italics beneath the standard error.
2 The number of M&As was predicted using the model reported in Table 2. The regression coefficient and its standard error 
for this variable has been multiplied by 10000.




AMOS Structural Equation Models Predicting Post-Acquisition Reorganization1
Target Restructuring Resource Transfer to Target Resource Transfer to Acquirer
Variables Model 10 Model 11 Model 12
Difference in acquirer-target shareholder rights 0.19*** 0.08*3 0.27***
0.11 0.10 0.10
0.32*** 0.14* 0.46***
Target country labor rights -0.17*** -0.30*** -0.15***
0.07 0.06 0.06
-0.17*** -0.30*** -0.16***
Target country labor rights*Acquirer M&A Experience -0.01 0.27*** 0.00
0.01 0.01 0.01
-0.01 0.02*** 0.00
Acquirer M&A Experience 0.01 0.31*** 0.12*
0.00 0.00 0.00
Acquirer country labor rights 0.09** 0.14** 0.21***
0.08 0.07 0.07
Target country labor rights*Difference in acquirer-target shareholder rights 0.01 -0.01 0.11*
0.40 0.36 0.37
Cross-border acquisition 0.07 -0.12* 0.13**
0.19 0.17 0.18
Domestic industry growth 0.01 -0.08 0.02
0.09 0.08 0.09
International industry growth -0.01 0.04 -0.11*
0.10 0.09 0.09
Acquisition motive: Access to new products -0.05 0.11* 0.42***
0.06 0.06 0.06
Acquisition motive: New market entry -0.42*** -0.03 -0.03
0.06 0.05 0.05
Acquisition motive: Manufacturing scale economies 0.02 -0.01 0.18***
0.07 0.06 0.06
Acquisition motive: Acquisition of resources -0.16*** -0.05 -0.09**
0.07 0.06 0.06
Acquisition motive: Transfer of resources 0.16** 0.09 0.13**
0.07 0.07** 0.07
Acquisition motive: Reduction of overcapacity 0.03 0.12** 0.11*
0.10 0.09 0.09
Acquisition motive: Reduction of financial risk -0.08 -0.04 -0.02
0.09 0.08 0.09
Acquisition motive: Turning around a failing firm -0.01 -0.02 0.12*
0.07 0.07 0.07
Acquisition motive: Block a rival 0.22*** 0.08 0.05
0.06 0.06 0.06
Pre-merger target profitability -0.21*** -0.02 -0.08
0.07 0.07 0.07
Pre-merger acquirer profitability 0.17** 0.10* 0.05
0.12 0.11 0.11
Relative annual sales of target to acquirer 0.05 0.12* 0.06
0.07 0.06 0.06
Public acquirer -0.04 0.08 0.00
0.18 0.16 0.17
Predicted # of M&As in target country (selection model)2 0.04 -0.15*** 0.06
0.00 0.00 0.00
R 2 44% 41% 48%
Chi-Square (degree of freedom) 1378 (300) 1383(300) 1396(300)
n 253 253 253
1Standard errors of estimates are shown in parentheses beneath unstandardized regression coefficients. 
For our three theoretical independent variables, the standardized estimates are shown in italics beneath the standard error.
2 The number of M&As was predicted using the model reported in Table 2. 
*p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .10; two-tailed tests. 
3
 Significant at one-tailed test.
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Appendix 1: Calculation of Summary Indicators of the EPL Strictness Index 
EPL summary indicators at four successive levels of aggregation  
          
Level 4 Level 3 Level 2 level 1   
Scale 0-6 Scale 0-6 Scale 0-6 Scale 0-6   
    Procedural  1. Notification procedures                                             (1/2) 
    inconveniences (1/3)  2. Delay to start a notice                                                  (1/2)
       3. Notice period after             9 months                           (1/7)
                                                         4 years                               (1/7) 
  Regular contracts Notice and severance pay                                                  20 years                              (1/7) 
  (version 2: 5/12) for no-fault individual  4. Severance pay after            9 months                         (4/21) 
  (version 1: ½) dismissals (1/3)                                                    4 years                             (4/21) 
                                                        20 years                             (4/21) 
       5. Definition of unfair dismissal                                      (1/4) 
Overall    Difficulty of dismissal  6. Trial period                                                                     (1/4)
summary   (1/3)  7. Compensation                                                                (1/4)
 indicator      8. Reinstatement                                                                 (1/4)
      9. Valid cases for use of fixed-term contracts                (1/2)
    Fixed-term contracts 10. Maximum number of successive contracts              (1/4) 
  Temporary contracts (1/2) 11. Maximum cumulated duration                                    (1/4)
  (version 2: 5/12)  Temporary work 12. TWA work is illegal                                  (1/2) 
  (version 1: ½) agency (TWA) 13. Restrictions on number of renewals                          (1/4)
    employment (1/2) 14. Maximum cumulated duration                                   (1/4)
   Collective   15. Definition of collective dismissal                              (1/4) 
  dismissals   16. Additional notification requirements                        (1/4) 
  (version 2: 2/12)   17. Additional delays involved                                         (1/4) 
  (version 1:0)   18. Other special costs to employers                               (1/4)
 
The first step of the procedure was to score all of these first-level measures of EPL in comparable units. They were 
converted into cardinal scores that were normalized to range from 0 to 6, with higher scores representing stricter 
regulation (see Table 2.A1.1). The three remaining steps consisted of forming successive weighted averages, 
constructing three sets of summary indicators that correspond to successively more aggregated measures of EPL 
strictness (see Table 2.A1.2). The last step of the procedure involved computing, for each country, an overall 
summary indicator based on the three subcomponents: strictness of regulation for regular contracts, temporary 
contracts and collective dismissals. The summary measure for collective dismissals was attributed just 40% of the 
weight assigned to regular and temporary contracts. The rationale for this is that the collective dismissals indicator 
only reflects additional employment protection triggered by the collective nature of the dismissal. In most countries, 
these additional requirements are quite modest. Moreover, summary measures for collective dismissals have only 
been available since the late 1990s. An alternative overall index, so-called version 1, has been thus calculated as an 
unweighted average of the summary measures for regular and temporary contracts only. While more restrictive than 
the previous index (so-called version 2), this alternative measure of overall EPL strictness allows comparisons over 
a longer period of time. 
In our paper, we used version 1 of the EPL strictness index because we had operations that dated back to 
the early 1990s. We also used version 2 of the index in sensitivity analyses, and our results remained similar. 
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Appendix 2: Survey Items 
 
 
CONSOLIDATION AND RESTRUCTURING OF R&D  
 
Please give a ROUGH ASSESSMENT of the proportion of the physical R&D facilities closed or resold, the proportion 
of the R&D personnel affected by the restructuring of R&D facilities, and the proportion of the R&D personnel 
cut as a result of the merger. 
 
 Acquired business        
% of physical R&D facilities closed or resold (as a 
proportion of total physical R&D facilities) 
0% 1-10% 11-30% 31-50% 51-70% 71-90% 91-100% 
% of R&D personnel affected by the restructuring of 
R&D facilities (as a proportion of total R&D personnel)  
0% 1-10% 11-30% 31-50% 51-70% 71-90% 91-100% 
% of R&D personnel cut (as a proportion of total R&D 
personnel) 
0% 1-10% 11-30% 31-50% 51-70% 71-90% 91-100% 
 
 
CONSOLIDATION AND RESTRUCTURING OF MANUFACTURING 
 
Please give a ROUGH ASSESSMENT of the proportion of the physical manufacturing facilities closed or resold, the 
proportion of the production capacity restructured, and the proportion of the manufacturing workforce cut as a 
result of the merger. 
 
 Acquired business        
% of physical manufacturing facilities closed or resold (as 
a proportion of total physical manufacturing facilities) 
0% 1-10% 11-30% 31-50% 51-70% 71-90% 91-100% 
% production capacity restructured (as a proportion of total 
production capacity)  
0% 1-10% 11-30% 31-50% 51-70% 71-90% 91-100% 
% of manufacturing workforce cut (as a proportion of total 
manufacturing workforce) 
0% 1-10% 11-30% 31-50% 51-70% 71-90% 91-100% 
 
 
CONSOLIDATION AND RESTRUCTURING OF SALES NETWORKS 
Please give a ROUGH ASSESSMENT of the proportion of the sales networks closed or resold, the proportion of the 
sales affected by the restructuring of sales networks, and the proportion of the sales personnel cut as a result of 
the merger. 
 Acquired business 
       
% of sales networks closed or resold (as a proportion of 
total sales networks) 
0% 1-10% 11-30% 31-50% 51-70% 71-
90% 
91-100% 
% sales affected by the restructuring of sales 
networks (as a proportion of total sales)  
0% 1-10% 11-30% 31-50% 51-70% 71-
90% 
91-100% 
% of sales personnel cut (as a proportion of total sales 
personnel) 









TRANSFER OF RESOURCES, KNOWLEDGE, AND CAPABILITIES 
To what extent have the acquired business’s staff and your existing business’s staff been transferred or rotated across 
the two firms? 
 Transfer of staff 
    From the acquired business to your business          From your business to the acquired business 
 NOT AT  TO SOME TO A VERY NOT AT  TO SOME TO A VERY 




   
 1. Senior executives .....................  1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4  5 
 2. Engineers, technicians .............  1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4  5 
 3. Researchers..............................  1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4  5 
 4. Manufacturing workers............  1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4  5 
 5. Sales personnel ........................  1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4  5 
 6. Administrative staff .................  1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4  5 
 
Control questions 
At the time of the acquisition, what was the growth of the market for the line of business of the  
 acquired firm? (Please answer with respect to both your domestic and international markets). 
 
 The domestic market (your country) The international market 
 1.  A RAPIDLY GROWING MARKET 1. A RAPIDLY GROWING MARKET 
 2. A SLOWLY GROWING MARKET 2. A SLOWLY GROWING MARKET 
 3. A STABLE MARKET 3. A STABLE MARKET 
 4. A SLOWLY DECLINING MARKET 4.  A SLOWLY DECLINING MARKET 
 5. A RAPIDLY DECLINING MARKET 5. A RAPIDLY DECLINING MARKET 
 6. NOT APPROPRIATE, (please specify): 6. NOT APPROPRIATE, (please specify): 
 
 Please use the scale below to assess the importance of the following motives in acquiring the 
 target business (from one to five, one being not important at all, five being very important). 
  NOT IMPORTANT                              VERY 
                                                                                                                                              AT ALL                               IMPORTANT 
 
  
 1. To enter a new geographical market............................................................. 1 2 3 4 5 
 2. To achieve economies of scale in manufacturing ......................................... 1 2 3 4 5 
 3. To achieve economies of scale in R&D, sales promotion,  
  distribution or administration ....................................................................... 1 2 3 4 5 
 4. To acquire assets (tangible and/or intangible) or capabilities  
  to be used in your existing business ............................................................. 1 2 3 4 5 
 5. To transfer assets (tangible and/or intangible) or  
  capabilities to assist the acquired business ................................................... 1 2 3 4 5 
 6. To reduce overcapacity in the industry......................................................... 1 2 3 4 5 
 7. To diversify your financial risk .................................................................... 1 2 3 4 5 
 8. To turn around a failing firm ........................................................................ 1 2 3 4 5 




Relative proportion of the acquired business’s annual sales in comparison to your firm’s sales  
before the acquisition (in the line of business concerned): 
1. < 25% 2. 25-49%       3. 50-74%     4. 75-100%      5. >100% 
 
Profitability (Profit/capital employed) of the  
acquired business relative to industry average before the 
acquisition: 
1. MUCH MORE PROFITABLE 
2. MORE PROFITABLE 
3. EQUIVALENT 
4. LESS PROFITABLE 
5. MUCH LESS PROFITABLE 
 
Profitability (Profit/capital employed) of your  
existing business relative to industry average before the 
acquisition: 
1. MUCH MORE PROFITABLE 
2. MORE PROFITABLE 
3. EQUIVALENT 
4. LESS PROFITABLE 
5. MUCH LESS PROFITABLE 
 
 
Number of business(es) or firm(s) acquired by your firm within the last five years: 
...............................   ACQUIRED FIRMS  
 
 
  
 
